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NON-NETWORK BARRIERS
TO NETWORK NEUTRALITY
Mark R. Patterson*
INTRODUCTION

From outside the cyberlaw community, "network neutrality" can seem a
shibboleth. The concept receives a great deal of attention, but its central
importance is not obvious, at least to outsiders. On the contrary, it seems
narrow and technical: "Network neutrality is best defined as a network
design principle. The idea is that a maximally useful public information
network aspires to treat all content, sites, and platforms equally." 2 For most
users, who operate beyond these "network design principles," legal and
practical considerations make the Internet non-neutral in a number of
respects.
Legal limitations, particularly those related to intellectual
property, restrict the development of new Internet applications, and
practical necessity compels users to rely heavily on non-neutral
intermediaries. As Scott McNealy might say, "You [don't] have [net
'3
neutrality] anyway.... Get over it."
This essay takes a broad perspective on neutrality as its starting point,
focusing on several ways beyond the network proper in which the Internet
is non-neutral. The topic was prompted in part by what appear to be
different views regarding network neutrality held by the authors of the two
books that are subjects of this event. David Post, in In Search of Jefferson's
Moose,4 appears to favor, even to celebrate, 5 the technical perspective on

* Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to thank Mark Riley
for valuable research assistance.
1. See, e.g., ROBERT D. ATKINSON & PHILIP J. WEISER, THE INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION
FOUND., A "THIRD WAY" ON NETWORK NEUTRALITY (2006), available at http://www.itif.org/

files/netneutrality.pdf; Barbara van Schewick, Toward an Economic Frameworkfor Network
Neutrality, 5 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 329 (2007); Tim Wu, Network Neutrality,
BroadbandDiscrimination,2 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 141 (2003); Christopher S.

Yoo, Network Neutrality and the Economics of Congestion, 94 GEo. L.J. 1847 (2006); Tim
Wu, WhPy You Should Care About Network Neutrality, SLATE, May 1, 2006,
http://www.slate.com/id/2140850/.
2. Tim Wu, Network Neutrality FAQ, http://timwu.org/network-neutrality.html (last
visited Apr. 3, 2010).
3. The subject of McNealy's original comment was privacy. See Polly Sprenger, Sun
on Privacy: "Get Over It, " WIRED, Jan. 26, 1999, http://www.wired.com/politics/law/news/
1999/01/17538.
4. DAVID G.

POST, IN SEARCH OF JEFFERSON'S MOOSE:

CYBERSPACE (2009).
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neutrality that focuses on the Internet's communication schemes. In
contrast, Jonathan Zittrain, in The Future of the Internet,6 would apply
neutrality principles more broadly, to promote what he calls "API
neutrality," where he says there is "a parallel debate that is not taking place
at all."'7 Zittrain is concerned with restrictions imposed on the use of
proprietary "information appliances" like the Xbox or even Internet services
like Facebook. The concern in this essay is somewhat similar, but focuses
on more general, rather than application-specific, deviations from neutrality
that affect all users of the Internet.
Other commentators have pointed out that the Internet is not neutral.
Much of this commentary has been focused on government censorship,
where there are numerous examples of non-neutrality: political censorship
in China and other countries, 8 government bans on various sorts of harmful
material, 9 and even government efforts to remove copyrighted material
from the Internet.10 But others have also written more generally, observing
5. Post's enthusiasm for the technical aspects of network issues is most evident in his
discussion of the Internet Engineering Task Force. Id. at 134-39.
6. JONATHAN ZITrRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET-AND How To STOP IT (2008).

7. Id. at 181. By "API neutrality," Zittrain refers to the absence of restrictions on
interaction with information appliances and software systems, such as cellphones or Xbox
and Microsoft's Windows operating system or Facebook. Some producers of such
information products restrict the extent to which third parties can interact with the products,
and Zittrain suggests that such restrictions should be impernissible at least for producers that
seek to cut off third-party interaction after having previously allowed and benefited from it.
Id. at 181-85.
8. See, e.g., Jonathan Zittrain & John Palfrey, Internet Filtering: The Politics and
Mechanisms of Control, in ACCESS DENIED: THE PRACTICE AND POLICY OF GLOBAL
INTERNET FILTERING 29 (Ronald Deibert et al. eds., 2008).

9. See Hannibal Travis, The Future According to Google: Technology Policyfrom the
Standpoint of America's Fastest-GrowingTechnology Company, 11 YALE J.L. & TECH. 209,
225-26 (2009) ("When Google launched its Chinese version in 2006, the Chinese
government lambasted the site for linking to 'illegal' content such as pornography, failing to
comply with local licensing laws, and informing users that Chinese law restricted the results
they saw. Google had to hand over control of part of its Chinese operations to a local
Chinese partner, Ganji.com, with the result that users would be denied access to 'sites the
governing Communist Party finds objectionable ....' (footnote omitted) (quoting Philip P.
Pan, Chinese Media Assail Google, WASH. POST, Feb. 22, 2006, at A9)). The tension
between China and Google came to a head in March when Google followed through on an
earlier threat by closing its Internet search service in China and redirecting users to its
uncensored search engine in Hong Kong. Miguel Helft & David Barboza, Google Closes
Search Service Based in China, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2010, at A1.
10. See Molly Beutz Land, Protecting Rights Online, 34 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 22-23
(2009) ("Internet filtering to protect copyrighted materials has also been increasing in
Europe, following models established in the United States. In these situations, states are
engaging in actions that have the potential to violate individual rights in order to comply
with their international obligations to protect digital works. Human rights advocates and
A2K advocates alike would seek to broaden the practical and legal policy space available to
states to choose methods of complying with their obligations that are less harmful to
individual rights." (citing Sangamitra Ramachander, Internet Filtering in Europe, in ACCESS
DENIED: THE PRACTICE AND POLICY OF GLOBAL INTERNET FILTERING, supra note 8, at 186,
191)); see also Joseph D. Schleimer, Protecting Copyrights at the "Backbone" Level of the
Internet, 15 UCLA ENT. L. REv. 139 (2008) (favoring control of copyrighted material).
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both that neutrality principles for the Internet are similar to those in other
contexts11 and that the Internet-related contexts in which the principles
12
come into play go well beyond technical issues of network access.
The focus here is at the same time more directly on the Internet itself and
less on explicit limits on access. What sorts of neutrality do users want
from the Internet? Is the key issue the usual one of net neutrality, whether
Internet data-transfer protocols treat all data the same? Or is it whether the
Internet as experienced by typical users "treat[s] all content, sites, and
platforms equally"? 13 The thrust of the argument here is that the Internet
experience for most users involves a number of intermediaries, and that
those intermediaries can and do skew the experience in a number of ways.
A truly neutral Net would require more than technical neutrality; it could be
ensured only by regulating or restricting the ways in which those
14
intermediaries operate.
In this respect, the perspective here differs, at least somewhat, from both
Post's in In Search of Jefferson's Moose and Zittrain's in The Future of the
15
Internet. Post is an advocate of end-to-end, neutral network principles,
while Zittrain would accept, and even recommends, deviation from
11. One of the most prominent net-neutrality advocates, Tim Wu, has placed it in
context:
The actual term "network neutrality," new or not, has a lot in common with [a lot]
of old ideas. The concept of a "common carrier," dating from 16th century
English common law, captures many similar concepts. A common carrier, in its
original meaning, is a private entity that performs a public function (the law was
first developed around port authorities). Furthermore, in networking, the "end-toend" principle of network design is also a close cousin, if not the direct ancestor of
network neutrality. David Isenberg's lucid and well known "dumb pipe paper" is
more or less the same idea.
Moreover, the basic economic problem found in the network neutrality debate (a
form of "platform exclusion" or "vertical foreclosure") can be found in many other
markets. In radio, for example, you have the problem of "payola"--payments
from the recording industries to radio stations, in exchange for playing their songs.
Payola isn't great for music in the United States-it is one of the reasons radio
stations all sound the same.
However, I should point out that not all economists think that things like payola
are actually a problem. They argue that if payola is inefficient then radio stations
that don't accept payments will have an advantage, and would therefore stop, ergo,
payola must be welfare maximizing.
Wu, supra note 2.
12. See, e.g., Berin Szoka & Adam Thierer, Net Neutrality, Slippery Slopes & High-Tech
Mutually Assured Destraction, PROGRESS SNAPSHOT (Progress & Freedom Found., Wash.,
D.C.), Oct. 2009, at 2-3 & n.4, available at http://www.pff.org/issues-pubs/ps/2009/pdf/
ps5.11 -net-neutrality-MAD-policy.pdf.
13. See supra text accompanying note 2.
14. Zittrain makes a related point, focusing on the potential benefits from intermediaries.
He argues that "[n]ow that the PC and the Internet are so inextricably intertwined, it is not
enough for network engineers to worry only about network openness and assume that the
endpoints can take care of themselves. It is abundantly clear that many endpoints cannot."
ZITTRAiN, supra note 6, at 166-67. His focus is primarily on Internet security, and he argues
that the creationof intermediaries can be used to address security issues. Id.
15. POST, supra note 4, at 80-89.
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neutrality principles to address certain problems, primarily with regard to
security. 16 This essay does not so much take a position on the desirability
of neutrality as contend that the Internet is even now neutral only at the
most basic communication level. At higher levels, the Internet is at least
potentially non-neutral in a variety of ways that can significantly distort the
experiences of most of its users. It seems appropriate to focus attention on
those non-network non-neutralities, and to focus on them as a class, to
consider the degree to which the net is truly neutral.
This essay begins with a description of the net-neutrality problem in the
context of the recent Comcast17 decision by the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC). In that decision, the FCC condemned Comcast's
deviation from network neutrality in terms that could apply beyond the
network level. The subsequent section then describes three other contexts
in which neutrality, though not necessarily network neutrality, is an issue:
the difference in treatment of applications that are built upon uses of
copyrighted works and those that are not, possible bias in search-engine
results, and the use of browsing history to tailor users' visits to websites.
The following section then shows how at least some of the language in the
Comcast decision can also be applied in these other contexts, suggesting
that a policy of neutrality could have applicability broader than
communication services.
The final section briefly considers the
implications of the different possible interpretations of neutrality.
I. THE NET-NEUTRALITY DEBATE
8
David Post clearly describes the benefits of neutral end-to-end design.'
The simplicity and consistency of the connections between the ends makes it
easy for new ends to be added to the system, and that increases the potential
of the system. Each end can rely on the connections to deliver its
communications just as those same connections deliver all other
communications. That is, each end can rely on the neutral delivery of its
communications. As a result, each can freely direct its services at other ends,
or users, without worrying about any intrusion into the end-to-end relationship.
Many commentators defend this neutral, end-to-end approach as the
critical characteristic that makes the Internet what it is. Lawrence Lessig
and Robert McChesney, for example, say that it "is the simple but brilliant
'end-to-end' design of the Internet that has made it such a powerful force
for economic and social good," and they describe that characteristic as the
determinant of the future of the Internet: "It will decide whether the
16. See supra note 14.

17. Formal Complaint of Free Press & Pub. Knowledge Against Comcast Corp. for
Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, 23 F.C.C.R. 13,028 (2008) [hereinafter
Comcast], vacated, Comcast Corp. v. FCC, No. 08-1291, 2010 WL 1286658 (D.C. Cir. Apr.
6, 2010). On the significance of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit's vacating of
the FCC's decision, see infra note 30.
18. POST, supra note 4, at 80-89.
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Internet remains a free and open technology fostering innovation, economic
growth and democratic communication, or instead becomes the property of
toll booths at every on-ramp and
cable and phone companies that can put
19
exit on the information superhighway."'
The net-neutrality principle was recently tested by Comcast practices that
prompted an FCC decision. 20 Comcast had engaged in what it called "P2P
[peer-to-peer] management," which involved terminating some peer-to-peer
connections. Although not all such connections were terminated, many
were, and the experiences of some Comcast customers using peer-to-peer
services were significantly degraded. Comcast complicated matters by first
denying that it had engaged in the practice 21 and subsequently
misdescribing
it as a congestion management tool 22 before finally admitting
to it. 23 In response to complaints by Comcast customers and Free Press, a
nonprofit organization, the FCC opened a proceeding to consider the
propriety of Comcast's actions.
The FCC approached the issue as one involving its responsibility for
enforcing a "'national Internet policy. '"'24 The agency had previously
promulgated an Internet Policy Statement 25 whose "essence," it said in the
Comcast decision, was to "encourage broadband deployment and preserve
26
and promote the open and interconnected nature of the public Internet."
That meant, the FCC said, that "'consumers are entitled to run applications
and use services of their choice' and 'to access the lawful Internet content
27
of their choice,' subject to 'reasonable network management' practices."
It is this latter standard-"reasonable network management"-against
which it measured Comcast's practices.
The FCC concluded that Free Press had made a prima facie case that
Comcast's conduct violated these principles:
On its face, Comcast's interference with peer-to-peer protocols appears
to contravene the federal policy of promot[ing] the continued
development of the Internet because that interference impedes consumers
from run[ning] applications ... of their choice, rather than those favored
by Comcast, and that interference limits consumers' ability to access the
lawful Internet content of their choice, including the video programming
made available by vendors like Vuze. Comcast's selective interference
19. Lawrence Lessig & Robert W. McChesney, No Tolls on the Internet, WASH. POST,
June 8, 2006, at A22.
20. Comcast, supra note 17.
21. Comcast, supra note 17, at 13,030.
22. Id. at 13,031-32.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 13,034 (quoting Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet
over Wireline Facilities, Policy Statement, 20 F.C.C.R. 14,986, 14,987 (2005) [hereinafter
Internet Policy Statement]).
25. Internet Policy Statement, supra note 24.
26. Comcast, supra note 17, at 13,034 (quoting Internet Policy Statement, supra note 24,
at 14,988).
27. Id. (quoting Internet Policy Statement, supra note 24, at 14,988 & n.15).
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also appears to discourage the development of technologies-such as
peer-to-peer technologies-that maximize user control over what
information is received by individuals ... who use the Internet because
that interference (again) impedes consumers from run[ning]
applications ... of their choice, rather than those favored by Comcast.
Thus, Free Press has made a prima facie case that Comcast's practices do
must show that its
impede Internet content and applications, and Comcast
28
network management practices are reasonable.
The FCC set out a high standard for rebuttal of this prima facie case:
Comcast's practice selectively blocks and impedes the use of particular
applications, and we believe that such disparate treatment poses
significant risks of anticompetitive abuse. To the extent that a provider
argues that such highly questionable conduct constitutes "reasonable
network management," there must be a tight fit between its chosen
practices and a significant goal. Accordingly, for Comcast's practice to
qualify as reasonable network management, the company's justification
for its practice must clear a high threshold. Its practice should further a
interest and be narrowly or carefully tailored to serve
critically important
29
that interest.
Although the FCC was willing to assume that Comcast's stated goal of
easing network congestion was a critically important interest, the agency
concluded that Comcast failed to show that its practices were narrowly
tailored to that interest.
For present purposes, and despite the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit's very recent decision vacating this order, 30 the key point is the
FCC's broad and ringing endorsement of access principles that arguably go
beyond the simple data transfers that were at issue. As is described in the
next section, there are many other practices that "impede[] consumers from
run[ning] applications ... of their choice," that "limit[] consumers' ability
to access the lawful Internet content of their choice," and that "discourage
the development of technologies-such as peer-to-peer technologies-that
28. Id. at 13,052-53 (footnotes omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
29. Id. at 13,055-56 (footnote omitted).
30. Comcast Corp. v. FCC, No. 08-1291, 2010 WL 1286658 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 6, 2010).
The D.C. Circuit's decision was issued after this essay was written. The court concluded
that the FCC lacked authority "to regulate an Internet service provider's network
management practices." Id. at *1. This essay does not, however, rely on the FCC's order
qua order, but only on the principles expressed in the order and in the Internet Policy
Statement. The court did not take issue with these principles, so they presumably continue
to express the views of the FCC, and indeed it is possible that the D.C. Circuit's decision
will prompt legislative action reaffirming them. See Press Release, Representative Edward J.
Markey, Markey Statement on Comcast Decision (Apr. 6, 2010), http://markey.house.gov/
index.php?option=comcontent&task=view&id=3962&Itemid=141 ("It is important to note
that the Court neither called into question the wisdom of network neutrality policies nor did
it exonerate Comcast for its unreasonable interference with lawful consumer Internet
use.... I will also continue to work with my colleagues in Congress to provide the
Commission any additional authority it may need to ensure the openness of the Internet for
consumers, innovators and investors ....).
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maximize user control31over what information is received by individuals...
who use the Interet."
II. THE INTERMEDIATED INTERNET

The end-to-end, net-neutral vision described by Post, by Lessig and
McChesney, and by the FCC in Comcast does not reflect the Internet as
most users experience it. To be sure, sometimes a user knows where she is
going, and then she can connect directly to her goal at the other end. More
often, though, the user is seeking something-like information about a
particular product or thing-and she does not know at which website she
will find it. So she uses an intermediary--often a search engine like
Google-to help find what she is looking for, or even to help decide exactly
what it is that she is looking for.
There are a variety of ways in which this intermediated Internet can
become non-neutral. First, the availability of intermediaries, and thus of
ways in which one can find one's way on the Internet, or access content on
it, can be restricted. Incumbent intermediaries, whether in the online or
brick-and-mortar world, may seek to prevent competition from new
intermediaries. This has been the history of the delivery of online media,
with the owners of copyrighted content repeatedly seeking to control the
means by which that content is located and acquired. 32 This issue is
discussed below in the context of Napster.
Second, intermediaries themselves can be biased. I have previously
written about the incentives that tend to push intermediaries that provide
information toward non-neutrality. 3 3 One type of intermediary that I
discussed was the search engine, and concern about search-engine bias has
been increasingly expressed and elaborated, notably by Frank Pasquale and
Oren Bracha. 34 Although the extent of any possible bias on the part of
search engines is unclear, the much more intense focus on bias by
communication providers like Comcast is surprising given the relative
potential for harm, as discussed below.
Third, ends can also be middles. That is, one might believe that one has
reached the site that one was seeking, but that site might really present itself
Which version one sees might be
in several alternative versions.
determined by an intermediary level, imposed by the site owner, that tailors
31. Comcast, supra note 17, at 13,052-53 (omissions in original) (footnotes omitted)

(internal quotation marks omitted).
32. See infra text accompanying notes 44-45.
33. Mark R. Patterson, On the Impossibility of Information Intermediaries (Fordham

Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 13, 2001), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfmabstract id=276968.
34. See generally Oren Bracha & Frank Pasquale, FederalSearch Commission? Access,
Fairness,and Accountability in the Law of Search, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1149 (2008); Frank
Pasquale, Internet Nondiscrimination Principles: Commercial Ethics for Carriers and
Search Engines, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 263.
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the site to information that it has about you. In a network sense, the
connection is still end-to-end, but the practical effect is non-neutral.
Several ways in which this sort of non-neutrality can be effected are
discussed below.
A. IntellectualProperty and Non-Neutrality
Was Napster less innovative than Facebook or Twitter or YouTube? Its
initial success was comparable, 35 but of course legal troubles drove it out of
business before it became as old even as Facebook is now. 36 Napster's
innovation was directed at the selection and acquisition of copyrighted
materials, and even though Napster itself did not directly infringe
copyrights, its users did. As a result, the copyright owners were able to use
doctrines of indirect infringement to shut down Napster. Copyright did not
pose similar obstacles to Facebook or Twitter, or even to YouTube, 37 so
those applications were able to thrive.
It is important to remember how innovative Napster was. Its peer-to-peer
transfer method was a reflection of the end-to-end nature of the Internet
itself, but Napster at the time was still an innovative application of that
architecture. Perhaps even more innovative was the opportunity that Napster
offered users to look into the music selections of others. With Napster, one
could browse the music libraries of other members of the network, in what
could be used as an early, more effective version of the now-ubiquitous
"Those who chose this item also chose these other items" marketing strategy.

35. Napster was started in January of 1999, Spencer E. Ante, Inside Napster: How the
Music-Sharing Phenom Began, Where It Went Wrong, and What Happens Next, Bus. WK.,
Aug. 14, 2000, at 112, and apparently had at least five million users eighteen months after its
launch. See John Borland, Napster Traffic FiguresRaise New Questions, CNET NEWS, Aug.
4, 2000, http://news.cnet.com/2100-1023-244073.html ("Napster says it had 20 million user
accounts by mid-month, before the week's surge in traffic and downloads. That's probably
an overestimate, as Media Metrix counted only 4.7 million active home Napster users in
June. But even the lower figure is a substantial-and fast-growing-slice of the online
listening audience."). Facebook was launched in February 2004, Sarah Phillips, A Brief
History of Facebook, GUARDIAN (London), July 25, 2007, http://www.guardian.co.uk/
technology/2007/jul/25/media.newmedia ("In February 2004 Mr Zuckerberg launched 'The
facebook', as it was originally known."), and fifteen months later, it had roughly 2.8 million
registered users. See Bootie Cosgrove-Mather, FacebookFrenzy: Where College Students
Find Old Friends, Make New Ones, CBS NEWS, July 5, 2005, http://www.cbsnews.com/
stories/2005/07/05/tech/main706634.shtml (noting that Facebook is "[c]onstantly updated by
its 2.8 million registered users at more than 800 colleges and universities"). The comparison
is perhaps misleading, because Facebook was initially available only on college networks.
See Posting of Justin Smith to Inside Facebook, Mapping Facebook's Growth over Time,
http://www.insidefacebook.com/2008/08/19/mapping-facebooks-growth-over-time/
(Aug.
19, 2008). Still, it seems likely that Napster's early growth was primarily due to students as
well.
36. Napster (in its original form) shut down in 2001, only about two years after it
launched. See Wikipedia, Napster, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Napster (last visited Apr. 3,
2010).
37. See infra text accompanying notes 38-44.
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The information provided by Napster was even more valuable because it
provided much more context in which to learn of others' tastes.
Of course, Napster also facilitated copyright infringement, and it is
reasonable to wonder whether Napster would have gotten significant use if
it did not enable free file transfers. It is possible that more users were
interested in getting music for free than in deriving musical suggestions
from lists of others' files. But the successes of other, subsequent peer-topeer networks, and of iTunes, and the frequent use of similar marketing
techniques in other contexts, suggest that Napster could perhaps have
succeeded even if users had to pay for the music they transferred.
Among Napster's problems were that initially the illegality of its conduct
was not clear and that later it and its users could not easily license the music
for which it was facilitating transfers. The law was unclear because the U.S.
Supreme Court's focus in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios,
Inc.,38 on "substantial noninfringing uses" left unclear whether the capacity
for such noninfringing uses would be sufficient to avoid liability for Napster.
It was not. 39 Later, when Napster sought to convert itself to a paid40
subscription service, it had difficulty obtaining licenses from music labels.
YouTube presents an interesting contrast here. Although many of the
postings on YouTube are noninfringing, many are copyrighted, and
41
YouTube has encountered many of the same legal issues as Napster.
Indeed, some predicted that YouTube would go the way of Napster. But
YouTube has to a large extent cooperated with media companies in taking
down copyrighted video,4 2 and it was able, perhaps partly for that reason, to
negotiate license arrangements with major media companies, 4 3 thus
avoiding being shut down, though it continues to be involved in litigation.
Since its acquisition by Google, in fact, YouTube has instituted some
44
innovative arrangements with copyright owners.

38. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
39. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000), aff'd in
part, rev'd inpart,239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
40. See Wikipedia, Napster, supra note 36.
41. See, e.g., Jeremy W. Peters, Viacom Sues Google over YouTube Video Clips, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 14, 2007, at Cl; Giada Zampano & Liam Moloney, Update: Mediaset Files
EUR500 Million

Suit vs

Google 's

YouTube,

CNNMONEY.COM,

July

30,

2008,

http://money.cnn.com/news/newsfeeds/articles/djf5OO/200807301025DOWJONESDJONLI
NE000654-FORTUNE5 .htm.
42. See YouTube, Content Management:
Copyright Infringement Notification,
http://www.youtube.com/t/dmcapolicy (last visited Apr. 3, 2010). Indeed, YouTube is
deemed by some to be too cooperative. See, e.g., Tim Arango, Rights Clash on YouTube, and
Videos Disappear,N.Y. TIMES, March 23, 2009, at B 1.
43. Posting of Candace Lombardi to ZDNet News, YouTube Cuts Three Content Deals,
http://news.zdnet.com/2100-9588_22-149811 .html?tag-content;col 1 (Oct. 9, 2006, 14:57:00
EST).
44. Katie Allen, Google Seeks To Turn a Profit from YouTube Copyright Clashes,

GUARDIAN (London), Nov. 1, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2009/nov/01/
google-youtube-monetise-content.
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Why was the same path not followed by Napster? In part, the reason is
no doubt that the legal landscape was not so clear, so the optimal path was
not clear. But it is also important that, as compared with YouTube, Napster
had little noninfringing content. This presumably was not, however, by
decision. It was probably a combination of the facts that online video was
not yet in common distribution ten years ago and that people apparently are
not as interested in homegrown audio as in homegrown video. Moreover,
because Napster was a peer-to-peer system, it did not have the ability to
"take down" infringing material, which was located on its users' computers,
not its own.
It seems clear, though, that Napster was no less innovative than
YouTube. On the contrary, whereas Napster provided a new application of
peer-to-peer technology and a novel search method, YouTube's
contribution seems only to have been to appreciate that people would be
interested in viewing others' videos. But because Napster's innovation was
a threat to the delivery methods used and controlled by media companies,
they were able to use copyright to eliminate Napster from the market. In
doing so, they replicated a century-old pattern that has been described by
several commentators. 45 Repeatedly, copyright owners have sought to
prevent the entry of new methods of distribution of copyrighted works. And
46
copyright law has often allowed this sort of elimination of competition.
The effect is to make the Internet less accessible to innovative
applications and, therefore, to use Zittrain's term, less generative. Those
applications that, like Napster, are built on copyrighted works are subject to
suppression; other applications are more free. The point is not that
copyright infringement should be permissible. The point is instead that
among all the innovative ways that have been created to select and access
material on the Internet, the ones that, like Napster, are applied particularly
to copyrighted material are suppressed. In that respect, because copyright
owners can refuse to license their content and can instead pursue indirect
infringement actions, it is not the case that "'consumers are entitled to run
47
applications and use services of their choice.'
This is particularly ironic because it is the very peer-to-peer/end-to-end
nature of Napster and the Internet that created Napster's difficulties, in two
respects. First, Napster was only an intermediary connecting users. As
noted above, Napster had little ability, once it provided users with the
capability, to prevent them from transferring copyrighted files. Suppose
that Napster had sought to provide only its lists of user compositions, but
not to enable the transfer of files. Had it done so, surely someone else
45. See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright and Control over New Technologies of

Dissemination, 101

COLUM.

L.

REv.

1613

(2001);

Timothy

Wu,

Copyright's

Communications Policy, 103 MICH. L. REv. 278 (2004).

46. Wu, supra note 45, at 345-50, 360-66.
47. Comcast, supra note 17, at 13,034 (quoting Internet Policy Statement, supra note 24,
at 14,988); see supra text accompanying notes 25-27.
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would have devised a method to enable the transfers. It is still possible,
however, that Napster could have been found liable for inducing or
contributing to the infringement.
Second, the music companies pursued Napster, even though it did not
itself directly infringe, because it would have been too costly to identify and
pursue the individual infringers. Jonathan Zittrain suggests that "[t]he
Internet's future may be brighter if technology permits easier identification
of Internet users. '48 If such identification were possible, it would be easier
for entities like Napster to argue that they should not be subject to indirectinfringement liability for the infringement of others.
In the end, of course, it is difficult to know what we have lost by suits
like Napster49 and later Grokster50 and the threat they pose to innovative
intermediaries. Zittrain argues with regard to the music industry's lawsuits
against individual file sharers that "from the point of view of generativity,
'5 1
such lawsuits inflict little damage on the network and PCs themselves." It
may be true that lawsuits against the individual file sharers inflict little
damage, but it is not clear that the same is true for lawsuits against
intermediaries like Napster. The threat of copyright litigation may in fact
have a significant deterrent effect on innovations that can be applied in
some way to copyrighted works.
B. Search and Non-Neutrality
Search engines pose another sort of threat to net neutrality. Even where
access to websites is neutral in the sense that it is equally easy to reach all
sites, it can be non-neutral in practice, because knowledge of sites'
locations is mediated through the influence of search engines. If a search
engine places one site higher than another, that non-neutrality is likely to
lead to increased traffic at the favored site.
This sort of non-neutrality is not unusual. In other, non-Internet contexts,
we do not expect, or at least we do not get, neutrality. Consider the sales of
consumer goods. Often we acquire such goods in supermarkets or
department stores where not only are the goods selected by management,
but some are allocated shelf space at eye height and others are at floor level.
As a result, some goods are more prominent and easy to reach than others.
Moreover, this placement of goods on shelves is often influenced by
52
payments from the manufacturers of the goods.
48. ZITrRAIN, supra note 6, at 194. Zittrain adds that such identification should be
"combined with legal processes, and perhaps technical limitations, to ensure that such
identification occurs only when good cause exists." Id.
49. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000), affd in
part, rev'd in part, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
50. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
51. ZITTR.~N, supra note 6, at 194.

52. See

FED.

TRADE

COMM'N,

SLOTTING ALLOWANCES

IN THE RETAIL GROCERY

INDUSTRY: SELECTED CASE STUDIES INFIVE PRODUCT CATEGORIES 19-20 (2003) [hereinafter
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Although the placement of goods on supermarket shelves might seem
different from the delivery of search results, the product in both cases is
information. The purpose of payment for shelf space, at least from the
manufacturer's perspective, is to ensure that the product gets an
advantageous share of buyer attention. Search engines provide the same
sort of focusing of browser or buyer attention on particular websites.
But one might argue that Google, for example, does not allow payment
for placement in its search results. Only in its "sponsored links," the
argument would go, does Google allow commercial interests to affect its
results. For some users, those who do not carefully distinguish between the
regular listings and sponsored links, this might result in non-neutral
searching, 53 but those users are presumably a minority. Most users, or at
least most users who are seeking objectivity, focus on Google's so-called
"organic" search results.
54
Despite a burgeoning literature on search engines and possible bias,
there seems to be little hard evidence of intentional manipulation of results
by Google. But considerable effort is expended by other websites to try to
game the "organic" search results. Search-engine optimization (SEO), 55 or
the design of websites in order to move them up in search-engine results, is
an active business area, though it is difficult to find statistics on the amount
spent on the practice. Even if Google and other search engines seek to be
neutral, and seek to limit the effects of SEO, optimization is likely to affect
the results the search engines deliver. And it seems probable that many
websites will feel pressure to engage in SEO if they think their competitors
are doing so.
In the end, the view that search engines are neutral, or neutral enough,
presumably relies upon two assumptions:
that they can counter
SLOTTING ALLOWANCES], available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/11 /slottingallowancerpt
031114.pdf.
53. At least in 2002, the FTC was concerned that users were insufficiently aware of paid
search placement. See Consumer Alert, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Being Frank About Search
Engine Rank (Sept. 2002), http://www.ftc.govIbcp/edu/pubs/consumer/alerts/altl 19.shtm.
54. See generally Jennifer A. Chandler, A Right To Reach an Audience: An Approach to

Intermediary Bias on the Internet, 35 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1095 (2007); Urs Gasser, Regulating
Search Engines: Taking Stock and Looking Ahead, 8 YALE J.L. & TECH. 201 (2006); James

Grimmelmann, The Structure of Search Engine Law, 93 IOWA L. REv. 1 (2007); Frank
Pasquale, Rankings, Reductionism, and Responsibility, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 115 (2006).
55. See, e.g., Richard Morochove, Driving Site Traffic with Search Engine Optimization

and Paid Advertising, PC WORLD, Apr. 22, 2008, http://www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/
article/ 144859/drivingsitejtraffic with_search-engineoptimizationandpaidadvertising.
html ("SEO [search-engine optimization] refers to modifying your Web pages to enhance
your visibility in search engine results. If your business sells, say, left-handed widgets, your
goal is to be listed near the top of the results if someone performs a search using the
keywords 'left-handed widgets.' Research shows that if your site isn't within the top 30
search results, very few visitors will click through to your site. How do you reach that
coveted high rank in a search engine? You have to learn to think like the robots (also called
spiders and crawlers) that search engines such as Google use to find and catalog Web
pages.").
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optimization efforts and that a non-neutral approach instituted by the search
engine itself would, if discovered, result in loss of users. 56 Each of these
assumptions seems questionable. Although Google appears to devote
57
significant effort to discounting at least the most blatant versions of SEO,
there is little information available on how successful its efforts are. And
since there has been no dramatic disclosure of biased search-engine results,
it is difficult to know what the effect of such a disclosure would be,
especially with Google's large market share.
The current situation with regard to search is therefore not dissimilar to
that when there was uncertainty with regard to Comcast's conduct. 58 That
is, there is reason to think that there might be non-neutrality, but there is no
firm evidence of it. The concerns with Comcast might have been stronger,
and they were fairly quickly confirmed, 59 but the significance of those
differences is not clear. When network traffic is impeded, the user will
generally be aware of the problem, but if search results are skewed, it is not
clear that users would even detect it.

56. It is perhaps worth noting that even if Google and other search engines were
"neutral" in the sense of a lack of manipulation, that is not the only sense of neutrality that
we might care about. To the extent that search-engine algorithms, like Google's PageRank,
use numbers of links to determine search results, the result may be positive feedback. The
problem with popularity as a standard is that information alters preferences. That is, what
one prefers depends in part on what one has seen previously and on the alternatives to which
one has been exposed. The popularity of a site with many users, or Web pages, may reflect
not its intrinsic value, but merely the Google-reinforced desirability of linking to it. "The
PageRank derives from human-generated links, and is thought to correlate well with human
concepts of importance." Wikipedia, Google Search-Page Rank, http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Google-search#PageRank (last visited Apr. 3, 2010). Google actually acknowledges
this effect:
Occasionally, when a particular website is the subject of public attention, other
sites begin linking to it. This may elevate its importance as gauged by our ranking
software, which assigns a PageRank value based in part on who links to a given
page. Higher ranking in Google results may lead to more awareness, which may
lead to more links, and so on. This is sometimes referred to as a Googlebomb, or
Googlebombing.
Googlebombs:
Suspicious Results and Strange Behavior-Web Search Help,
http://www.google.com/support/websearch/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer--4115
(last visited
Apr. 3, 2010); see also Grimmelmann, supra note 54, at 22.
One aspect of this effect has been noted, and presumably taken advantage of, by
search-engine optimizers. "In spite of Google claiming otherwise, there is a direct
connection between buying AdWords and ranking in the organic search results. If a news
article is read by a few more people and gets just a few more links off the start it will become
the default article about that topic and acquire many self reinforcing links." Posting of Aaron
Wall to SEO Book.com, Google's Paid Inclusion Model, http://www.seobook.com/archives/
001989.shtml (Jan. 13, 2007).
57. See Matt Cutts:
Gadgets, Google, and SEO, How To Report Paid Links,
http://www.mattcutts.com/blog/how-to-report-paid-links/ (Mar. 2, 2009).
58. See Comeast, supra note 17, at 13,030-31.
59. Id. at 13,031-32.
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C. HTTP and Non-Neutrality
The final examples of non-neutrality to be discussed here come from
HTTP, the communications protocol for the World Wide Web. HTTP
provides several means for a website to obtain information about a user's
past browsing history. The website then can use this information to tailor
the user's experience based on that history, resulting in a non-neutral
experience, at least if neutrality is understood to mean that two users can
expect to have the same experience when they visit a website. The two
HTTP examples discussed here are Referer, 60 an HTTP-specified field that
can provide information to a website about the previous site visited by the
user, and cookies, which can provide a broader collection of information
about browsing histories.
David Post outlines the use of Referer, which he aptly characterizes as a
primary determinant of Internet commerce. 6 1 Post states, for example, that
Google "makes most of its money from the Referrer field."'62 When Google
delivers a user to the site of one of its advertisers, it is Referer that tells the
advertiser where the user came from, so that Google can be paid for sending
the user to the site.
The commercial role played by Referer for Google seems innocuous, or
at least reasonable, 6 3 but one can imagine more problematic possibilities for
these techniques. For example, a seller could offer different prices to
buyers depending on what site they came from. A recent study showed that
consumers are unaware of this possibility, 64 yet the author of that study
noted that "[a] retail photography Web site, for example, charged different
prices for the same digital cameras and related equipment, depending on
''65
whether shoppers had previously visited popular price-comparison sites.
Perhaps the most well-known example involved the probable use of
Referer by Ticketmaster. 66 To prevent another website, Tickets.com, from
linking directly to ticket-purchasing pages of its website, Ticketmaster
sought to block direct access, presumably by using Referer, but Tickets.corn

60. The technical specification refers to "Referer," rather than to "Referrer," so I will do
the same here.
61. POST, supra note 4, at 129-31.
62. Id. at 130.
63. But see infra p. 2860.
64. JOSEPH TUROW ET AL., OPEN TO EXPLOITATION: AMERICA'S SHOPPERS ONLINE AND

OFFLINE

(2005),

available at

http://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=

1035&context=asc-papers.
65. Anita Ramasastry, Web Sites Change Prices Based on Customers' Habits,
CNN.COM, June 24, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/LAW/06/24/ramasastry.website.prices/;
see also Joseph Turow, Have They Got a Deal for You: It's Suspiciously Cozy in the
Cybermarket, WASH. POST, June 19, 2005, at BI.

66. See Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. CV99-7654-HLH (VBKx), 2003
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6483 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2003); Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc.,
No. CVOO-7654-HLH (BQRx), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12987 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2000),
affid, 248 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2001).
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was able to defeat Ticketmaster's efforts. 67 Circumventing such efforts is
possible because a user can "spoof' Referer to make it appear that the user
is coming from a page different from the actual page.
The fact that Referer can be spoofed, though, does not mean that it
cannot effectively be used to provide non-neutral Internet experiences.
Although there is little public information on this, it seems likely that
websites use Referer to provide different experiences for different users. As
one commentator says, "[diepending on the requesting site, a developer can
'68
change marketing strategies, or even block/redirect a site all together.
And although some Web browsers allow users to turn off Referer, at least
with add-ons, 6 9 it seems unlikely that many users take advantage (or
disadvantage 70 ) of this feature.
Cookies are a better-known method of tracking browsing history. A
cookie is text sent by a Web server and stored on a user's computer by the
user's Web browser. The cookie can then be retrieved later by the server.
But some websites deliver information from multiple servers, including
those sending advertising banners. Then, to the extent that those banners
are delivered from multiple sites, considerable information can be
accumulated. Because cookies are much better known than Referer,
though, most if not all browsers provide the ability to deny cookies, even if
doing so can cause problems with websites that depend on them.
The practices enabled by Referer and cookies-such as price
discrimination among consumers-are of questionable value. Whether
valuable or not, though, these practices are non-neutral. But it is not the
sort of non-neutrality with which most net-neutrality advocates are
concerned. That leads, then, to the question of what sorts of non-neutrality
should concern us. The remainder of this essay takes up this question first
in the context of FCC statements in the Comcast decision and then more
generally.

67. See Patricia L. Bellia, Defending Cyberproperty, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 2164, 2215-16
& n.211 (2004).
68. CHAMP CLARK III ET AL., INFOSECURITY 2008 THREAT ANALYSIS 105 (2008); see
also ERIC T. PETERSON, WEB ANALYTICS DEMYSTIFIED:
A MARKETER'S GUIDE TO
UNDERSTANDING HOW YOUR WEBSITE AFFECTS YOUR BUSINESS 151 (2004) ("If you

understand what it was that brought the visitor to you, you can work to continue to connect
with the visitor along those lines, and perhaps drive the visitor to convert.").
69. See, e.g.,
James
Abbatiello,
RefControl:
Add-ons
for Firefox,
https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/953 (last visited Apr. 3, 2010).
70. By turning off Referer, a user would sacrifice any benefits that might be received by
using it. For example, if websites offered better prices to those who came to it from
comparison-shopping sites, turning off Referer would mean the user would not receive those
better prices. If, as seems likely, users that know how to turn off Referer are the same users
who shop more carefully, it would be exactly those users who know how to turn off Referer
who would suffer from doing so.
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III. COMCAST AND NON-NETWORK NON-NEUTRALITY

Is it less harmful for Ticketmaster to impose restrictions on how visitors
arrive at its Web pages than it is for Comcast to slow down certain Web
traffic? Or for the owners of music copyright to suppress a new means of
selecting and acquiring music files? In fact, if one takes the FCC's
statements in the Comcast decision seriously, they suggest that all of the
neutrality limitations discussed above are of concern. The language used
by the FCC was very broad, and this section considers whether this
language supports an expanded focus on neutrality in a broader range of
Internet contexts.
A. BitTorrent and Napster
Current peer-to-peer programs like BitTorrent, which were Comcast's
targets, are fundamentally similar to Napster. Moreover, like Napster, they
were initially used largely to effect transfers that infringed copyright, as the
FCC in Comcast described:
Although once relegated to serving, in most cases, the savviest Internet
users with unsavory or even unlawful purposes, BitTorrent and other
peer-to-peer technologies, such as Gnutella, have entered the mainstream.
New online content distributors, such as Vuze, Inc., rely on BitTorrent to
distribute video programming to millions of online viewers legally, as do
several established71distributors such as CBS, Twentieth Century Fox, and
Sports Illustrated.
Yet Comcast's hindering of BitTorrent was in the FCC's view
unreasonable, while the music labels' use of the courts to eliminate Napster
was legitimate.
The difference in result certainly is not related to
anticompetitive purpose, despite the FCC's reference to competitive effects:
"Peer-to-peer applications, including those relying on BitTorrent, have
become a competitive threat to cable operators such as Comcast because
Internet users have the opportunity to view high-quality video with
BitTorrent that they might otherwise watch (and pay for) on cable
television." 72 As described above, similar competitive implications were
presented by Napster, and were no doubt a factor in the music labels' desire
to eliminate it.
The key difference seems to be that by the time the FCC came to evaluate
Comcast's conduct, BitTorrent, as the FCC said, was being used
legitimately. Thus, BitTorrent benefited from the fact that it survived its
early outlaw days to become an upstanding citizen, defended vigorously by
71. Comcast, supra note 17, at 13,030 (footnote omitted) (citing Petition to Establish
Rules Governing Network Management Practices by Broadband Network Operators at 5, 78 & n.8, WC Docket No. 07-52 (Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n Nov. 14, 2007); Dan Mitchell,
What's Online: PiratesTake Sweden, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 19, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/
2006/08/19/business/19online.html?scp=1 &sq=Pirates+Take+Sweden&st=nyt).
72. Id.
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the FCC. Napster was not so lucky. So although the Comcast decision
defended net neutrality at a particular moment in time, it also dramatically
reflected the temporal "application non-neutrality" that can be produced by
the enforcement of copyright law.
Of course, there was no reason for the FCC in Comcast to consider the
issue of application non-neutrality. After all, by condemning Comcast, it
was defending BitTorrent. But if Comcast had effectively argued that its
73
actions were directed at deterring, or avoiding, copyright infringement,
the FCC apparently would have taken a different approach. It stated that
"providers, consistent with federal policy, may block ... transmissions that
violate copyright law."' 74 In other words, the FCC apparently would have
allowed Comcast to defend copyright by interfering with infringing
transmissions even if its "selective interference also appears to discourage
the 'development of technologies'-such as peer-to-peer technologies-that
,maximize user control over what information is received by individuals...
who use the Internet' because that interference (again) impedes consumers
' 75
from 'run[ning] applications ... of their choice.'
It is not clear why the FCC would vigorously defend network neutrality
but neglect application neutrality. Of course, application neutrality here
would have copyright implications as well. But the copyright cases are
seen not only as pitting owner versus infringer, but also incumbent
distributor versus innovating distributor. It is in that respect that the
network issues might add something to the balance, especially given that
the copyright doctrine in this area evolved outside the network context.
Perhaps the federal policy of neutrality to which Comcast refers should be
given some weight in cases of indirect infringement, tilting the balance
somewhat toward new techniques for distributing copyrighted works and
away from the works themselves.
Admittedly, it seems unlikely that the courts would explicitly adopt what
would effectively be an exception to indirect infringement liability for
Internet-based technologies. But the law is always focused on determining
which distinctions matter, which is to say it is focused on determining
which distinctions justify non-neutrality. And when one considers the
issues that will determine liability for peer-to-peer technologies after
Grokster and against the background of Internet-related legislation like the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 76 it seems clear that those issues serve
less to prevent copyright infringement than to impose spurious boundaries

73. The implications of copyright for another intermediary, search engines, are discussed
in Grimmelmann, supra note 54, at 33-36.
74. Comcast, supra note 17, at 13,058.

75. Id. at 13,052 (omissions in original).
76. A roadmap for peer-to-peer technologies is offered in FRED VON LOHMANN, ELEC.
FRONTIER FOUND., IAAL*:

WHAT PEER-TO-PEER DEVELOPERS NEED To KNOW ABOUT

COPYRIGHT LAW (2006), http://w2.eff.org/IP/P2P/p2pcopyright-wp-v5.pdf.
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In that respect, they are the

B. Equal Access and Google
Whether Google or other search engines slant their "objective" results to
accommodate commercial interests is unknown. It is perhaps unlikely that
they could do so dramatically without detection, but it seems just as likely
that minor tweaks would evade detection. A key consideration is that if a
search engine used Referer in the way it was intended to be used, it would
provide the same Referer information-i.e., the URL for the search results
page-whether the user clicked on a sponsored listing or on one of the
main, "organic" listings. To the extent, then, that the search engine was
compensated based on visits, moving a sponsor's listings up in the main
results would result in greater compensation, yet it would be unclear from
the HTTP trail that any manipulation had occurred.
These sorts of practices might fall within the FCC's concerns in
Comcast.77 The FCC gave short shrift to Comcast's argument that it had
only delayed, not blocked, peer-to-peer services: "Regardless of what one
calls it, the evidence . . . shows that Comcast selectively targeted and
terminated the upload connections of its customers' peer-to-peer applications
and that this conduct significantly impeded consumers' ability to access the
content and use the applications of their choice." 78 Perhaps it would view the
demotion of websites in search results as a similar impeding of access
(though search engines presumably would be outside the FCC's jurisdiction).
As the FCC said, "the expenditure of both creative and financial capital on
such content and applications is much less likely if large numbers of Internet
79
users will be unable to access them in an unfettered manner."
Indeed, the harm from a biasing of search engines would arguably be
greater than the harm from Comcast's practices. Comcast denied users, at
least temporarily, the ability to access files through peer-to-peer services.
But the users were at least aware that their efforts were unsuccessful. The
obstacle is technical, not unlike what would happen if connections were in
fact reset, as Comcast suggested in the messages it sent. If a search engine
biases results, the situation is different. Users are still able to access sites,
but they might be led to sites that they would not have chosen. The
obstacle here is one of distorted choice. Users still would be able to reach
the sites of their choice, if they were able to learn of them. Whether one
views the obstacles posed by a search engine as a "fettering" of users
appears to be a matter of definition.

77. See Comcast, supra note 17. The issue, of course, is not whether this would be an
issue for the FCC. In the past, it has been the FTC that has concerned itself with searchengine issues.
78. Id. at 13,054.
79. Id. at 13,039.
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One can compare the potential for this sort of biasing of search engines
with "slotting allowances" in retail stores, 80 as suggested above. Slotting
allowances are payments made by manufacturers for placement of their
products on retailers' shelves. 81
In antitrust analysis, potential
anticompetitive effects can result from the effective exclusion, even if not
complete, of competitors of those manufacturers that pay the slotting
allowances. The potential countervailing benefits are twofold. First, there
may be a signaling effect, whereby manufacturers that expect greater return
on the placement of their goods are likely to pay more for that placement.
Second, the payments can be viewed as simple compensation for valuable
shelf space.
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has devoted attention to the
competitive effects of slotting allowances, and the anticompetitive effect
might be greater in the search-engine context. In retail, there are generally
multiple retail outlets that buyers use. Buyers may, for example, frequent
several grocery stores. Internet users typically concentrate their searches in
one search engine, 82 and then often on the first page (the eye-level shelves?)
of search results. As a result, the market power of a search engine is
probably greater than that of most retailers, and the degree of exclusion to
those harmed by disadvantageous search result placement is
correspondingly greater.
Furthermore, at least the second justification noted above for slotting
allowances seems less significant for search engines. In contrast to the cost
of providing brick-and-mortar shelf space, there would seem to be a lower
cost of maintaining the search-engine result space. Although there are some
fixed costs for servers, algorithm development, etc., the most significant
cost of placing a website in the search results would seem to be the
opportunity cost of selling that space to another site. In addition, search
engines do not make their profits directly from the delivery of search results
in the way that retailers profit from delivery of goods, so the interests of a
search engine are less likely to be aligned with those of its customers.
But of course the key difference between slotting allowances and
Comcast on the one hand and search engines on the other is that the use of
slotting allowances and Comcast's practices are proven, but there is no such
proof for Google or other search engines. Although some have expressed
suspicions, 83 and there has developed a considerable legal literature based
80. This analogy seems not to have been developed in the law review literature on
search engines, though it has been discussed in several blogs. See Kevin Lee, Payingfor
Shelf Space in the Search Supermarket, CLICKZ, Sept. 1, 2006, http://www.clickz.com/
3623308; Posting of Joshua Wright to The Conglomerate, Some Economics of Payola,
http://www.theconglomerate.org/2005/08/some-economics_.html (Aug. 1, 2005).
8 1. See SLOTTING ALLOWANCES, supra note 52.

82. Here there would be a disadvantage to users to the extent that search engines used
the same algorithms.
83. See, e.g., Miguel Helft & Geraldine Fabrikant, Whose Tube?: Viacom Sues Google
over Viacom Clips on Its Sharing Website, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2007, at Cl; The Precursor
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on the possibility of manipulation, for the most part there seems to be little
if any evidence of search-engine non-neutrality. 84 And this is so despite the
considerable incentives that search 85engines and other information
intermediaries have to slant their results.
For that reason, most of the proposals for search-engine governance have
not proposed remedies for manipulation; rather, they have mandated
disclosure to detect possible or suspected manipulation. In this respect,
those proposals echo the network-neutrality context. An underlying
foundation of the Comcast decision is that of disclosure. As the FCC
chairman put it in an accompanying statement, "[a] hallmark of whether
something is reasonable is whether an operator is willing to disclose fully
and exactly what [it is] doing. Consumers need proper disclosure so that
' '86
they can make informed decisions when purchasing broadband service.
Although the Commission did not make quite as broad a statement in its
decision, it did say that "the anticompetitive harm perpetuated by
discriminatory network management practices is clearly compounded by
failing to disclose such practices to consumers." 87 This principle would
presumably also apply to search services, where of course Google and other
search engines tightly guard their search algorithms.
Robert Atkinson and Philip Weiser have offered a disclosure-based netneutrality proposal that one could imagine being applied in the searchengine context:
Congress should require broadband providers to state their broadband
access and usage policies in clear terms. These terms should specify the
level of bandwidth, amount of latency (delay), and any limitations on the
ability of consumers to access the content or services of their choice. The
FCC should monitor such behavior and take action against those firms
that fail to comply with them. In addition, any firm selling "broadband
Interet access" must make available a basic and growing level of open,
unmanaged Internet access. Firms that do not meet this FCC-defined
requirement would
be prohibited from calling any of their services
88
"broadband."
Blog, New Evidence of Google Search Bias, http://precursorblog.com/content/newevidence-google-search-bias-its-relevant-doj-investigation-google-yahoo-ad-deal
(Aug. 14,
2008, 15:14 EDT); Chris Crum, Is Google Showing Political Bias with Search Results,
WEBPRONEwS, Feb. 2, 2009, http://www.webpronews.com/topnews/2009/02/02/is-google-

showing-political-bias-with-search-results;

Posting

of

Philipp

Lenssen

to

Google

Blogscoped, Google Allows Itself a Special Ad, http://blogoscoped.com/archive/2008-0806-n64.html (Aug. 6, 2008).

84. Posting of Scott Buresh to Search Engine Guide, Google's Paid Search vs. Organic
Results-A Rickety Wall of Separation, http://www.searchengineguide.com/scottburesh/googles-paid-search-vs-organic-results-a.php (Nov. 13, 2007).

85. See Patterson, supra note 33.
86. Statement of Kevin J. Martin, Chairman, FCC, Broadband Indus. Practices, WC
Docket No. 07-52 (Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n Aug. 1, 2008).
87. Comcast,supra note 17, at 13,058.
88. ATKINSON & WEISER, supra note 1, at 2.
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As Atkinson and Weiser point out, this "notice and monitoring regime" is
89
similar to an approach to Internet privacy that the FTC has recommended.
A complaint regarding search engines produced a similar result. With
regard to "paid placement," or payment for higher rankings or more
prominent placements, the FTC staff recommended that search engines
"make any changes to the presentation of your paid-ranking search results
that would be necessary to clearly delineate them as such, whether they are
segregated from, or inserted into, non-paid listings." 90 With regard to "paid
inclusion," which is payment to be "included in a search engine's index, or
pool, of sites available for display as search results, when that Web site or
URL might not otherwise have been included," 9 1 the recommendation was
"that if your search engine uses paid inclusion programs that may distort
rankings or placement criteria, you clearly describe how sites are selected
'92
for inclusion in your indices.
For present purposes, the question is whether the FCC imprimatur
regarding disclosure obligations in the context of the net-neutrality debate
should provide support for disclosure by search engines. Even though
search engines are presumably outside the jurisdiction of the FCC, if we do
indeed have a national Internet policy that makes it impermissible to
"significantly impede[] consumers' ability to access the content and use the
applications of their choice," 93 it is hard to see why both requirements of
neutrality and disclosures of non-neutrality would not apply just as strongly,
and perhaps even more strongly, to search engines as to access providers.
C. Where Are the Ends in End-to-End?
The alteration of users' experiences based on their browsing history that
is made possible by Referer and cookies raises the question of where the
"ends" in end-to-end lie. If all that is required to vindicate neutral end-toend principles is that a user be delivered properly to the website that the
user sought, then the use of browsing history to tailor the user's experience
at that site could be neutral. In fact, from one perspective the tailoring of
experiences at a website seems like a vindication of end-to-end principles.
If the goal of end-to-end is to allow the sites at the endpoints to shape the
Internet experience as they like, then there is no problem with letting them
provide different experiences to different users.

89. Id. at 10-11.
90. Letter from Heather Hippsley, Acting Assoc. Dir., Div. of Adver. Practices, Fed.
Trade Comm'n, to Search Engine Companies (June 27, 2002), available at

http://www.ftc.gov/os/closings/staff/commercialalertattatch.shtm.
91. Letter from Heather Hippsley, Acting Assoc. Dir., Div. of Adver. Practices, Fed.
Trade Comm'n, to Gary Ruskin, Executive Dir., Commercial Alert (June 27, 2002),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/closings/staff/commercialalertletter.shtm.
92. Hippsley, supra note 90.
93. Comcast,supra note 17, at 13,054.
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But this depends on what is viewed as the "end." Consider the
Ticketmaster case again. 94 If the relevant "end" for end-to-end purposes is
the Web page for purchase of a particular ticket, Ticketmaster's use of
Referer or cookies to try to prevent users from reaching that page from
Tickets.com would be problematic. Only if the relevant "end" is the
Ticketmaster website as a whole should Ticketmaster be able to force users
to follow a designated path within that website. The concern is even greater
if, in contrast to the Ticketmaster instance, browsing history is not used to
deny access but to alter it based on some aspect of that history, such as
whether a user has comparison shopped. In that case, the use of Referer and
cookies can provide different experiences for different users in a way that
the users do not know of, let alone approve.
This sort of practice can actually be analogized to the practices of
copyright owners in the peer-to-peer context. On the Ticketmaster website,
one might follow a defined path to the page at which one can buy a
particular ticket. The path to that final page might involve selecting certain
characteristics of the ticket, such as the date and general location, but not
others, such as proximity to the aisle or absence of an overhanging balcony.
Another, competing provider, like Tickets.com, might seek to compete by
offering alternative search criteria, just as Napster competed by offering
different music-selection criteria. This might lead users to search for tickets
on the competing website, where they might view different advertisements,
rather than on Ticketmaster's. And Ticketmaster might then seek to use its
control over the actual tickets to force use of its own website, just as
copyright owners might seek to use their control over copyrighted material
to force use of their distribution systems.
How, then, do we decide whether a particular use of Referer or cookies is
appropriate? The Comcast decision offers one way to consider this issue.
Comcast had used a technical feature, a "reset packet," for an unintended
purpose, and the FCC disapproved:
[T]o the extent that Comcast is using TCP reset packets in a different
manner than they were intended to be used, and service providers respond
by modifying their services to circumvent Comcast's efforts, that could
undermine the usefulness and reliability of reset packets in general, and
hinder the efficiency of the network. 9 5

94. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
95. Comeast, supra note 17, at 13,037; see also id. at 13,040 ("Thus, 'variances from

those standard protocols and practices damage[] the Internet as a whole,' including the
ability of entrepreneurs to enter the market with new Internet services." (quoting Opening
Statement of Dr. David P. Reed, Adjunct Professor, MIT Media Lab., at the FCC's en banc
Hearing on Broadband Network Management Practices, WC Docket No. 07-52 (Fed.
Commc'ns
Comm'n
Feb.
25,
2008),
available at
http://www.fcc.gov/
broadbandnetworkmanagement/022508/reed.pdf)).
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We might consider, then, whether there are accepted purposes for Referer
and cookies, and whether the uses at issue here conform to them. The latest
version of the HTTP specification provides this description:
The Referer header allows servers to generate lists of back-links to
resources for interest, logging, optimized caching, etc. It also allows
obsolete or mistyped links to be traced for maintenance. Some servers
use Referer as a means of controlling where they allow links from (socalled "deep linking"), but it should be noted96that legitimate requests are
not required to contain a Referer header field.
So the specification at least acknowledges the use of Referer for the sort of use
to which Ticketmaster might have put it. It is important to note, though, that
the last sentence of this passage, the one that refers to deep linking, first
appeared in the July 2009 specification; previous versions had not included that
sentence. 97 I have been unable to find information on the history of the change.
With regard to cookies, the HTTP specifications are in a proposed, but
apparently unadopted, standard from 2000.98 This proposal describes the
use of cookies, but makes a distinction between cookies sent by the server
visited by the user and so-called third-party cookies, which are those sent
by other servers through the server requested by the user.9 9 The proposed
standard forbids third-party cookies, 100 which are the ones that have raised
the most concern about privacy. This clear expression of disapproval is
weakened, however, by the absence of adoption of the standard, and it has
not been followed by at least some designers. 10 1
Thus, there is some uncertainty in the technical standards, but from the
perspective of those standards the use of Referer and at least third-party
cookies to alter users' Internet experiences seems problematic. If the FCC's
reference in Comcast to technical purposes is taken seriously, it seems that
this sort of non-neutrality could be viewed by the agency as problematic.
More to the point, since these practices are presumably outside the FCC's
jurisdiction, they suggest more generally that perhaps the practices should
be considered as having implications that are comparable to those of
concern in the net-neutrality debate.
That is especially so given the deference that we typically give to the
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), which sets technical standards in
96. HTTP/1.1, part 2: Message Semantics, § 9.6 (Oct. 26, 2009), http://tools.ietf.org/id/
draft-ietf-httpbis-p2-semantics-08.txt.
97. Compare HTTP/1.1, part 2:
Message Semantics, § 9.6 (July 13, 2009),
http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/browser/draft-ietf-httpbis/07/draft-ietf-httpbis-p2-

semantics-07.txt, with HTTP/1.1, part 2: Message Semantics, § 9.6 (March 9, 2009),
http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/browser/draft-ietf-httpbis/06/draft-ietf-httpbis-p2semantics-06.txt.
98. HTTP State Management Mechanism (Oct. 2000), http://tools.ietforg/html/rfc2965.
99. Id.
100. Id. § 3.3.6; see also HTTP Cookie,
wiki/HTTP cookie (last visited Apr. 3, 2010).
101. HTTP Cookie, supra note 100.

Wikipedia,

http://en.wikipedia.org/
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this area, as David Post describes. 10 2 Regardless of whether one is as
enthusiastic as Post about the IETF's role, the history here could be of
concern. If one does not think that deference to the IETF is appropriate,
then one would likely object to the fact that this issue was allocated to them
to begin with. And even if one is generally willing to allocate these
decisions to the IETF, the fact that they made a proposal in 2000 with
regard to third-party cookies, an issue with considerable social-policy
implications, and that the proposal has been ignored, is not reassuring.
Perhaps a disclosure approach, as in the search-engine context, would be
preferable. This in fact was the approach taken, or almost taken, in Europe.
The European data privacy directive provides that storing data, like cookies, on
a user's computer "is only allowed on condition that the subscriber or user
concerned is provided with clear and comprehensive information..., inter alia
about the purposes of the processing, and is offered the right to refuse such
processing by the data controller."' 10 3 This provision, however, according to an
10 4
EC staff report, apparently "is generally not implemented in practice."
The void here recalls the absence of clear rules in the net-neutrality
arena. Despite the Comcast decision, which in any event has been vacated
as beyond the FCC's authority, 10 5 the merits of neutrality rules are open to
question. The previous sections have suggested that neutrality rules might
102. POST, supra note 4, at 133-41.
103. Council Directive 2002/58, art. 5, para. 3, 2002 O.J. (L 201) 37, 44 (EC), availableat
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2002:201:0037:0037:EN:PDF.
The directive also comments on the legitimacy of cookies:
[S]uch devices, for instance so-called "cookies", can be a legitimate and useful
tool, for example, in analysing the effectiveness of website design and advertising,
and in verifying the identity of users engaged in on-line transactions. Where such
devices, for instance cookies, are intended for a legitimate purpose, such as to
facilitate the provision of information society services, their use should be allowed
on condition that users are provided with clear and precise information in
accordance with Directive 95/46/EC about the purposes of cookies or similar
devices so as to ensure that users are made aware of information being placed on
the terminal equipment they are using. Users should have the opportunity to refuse
to have a cookie or similar device stored on their terminal equipment. This is
particularly important where users other than the original user have access to the
terminal equipment and thereby to any data containing privacy-sensitive
information stored on such equipment. Information and the right to refuse may be
offered once for the use of various devices to be installed on the user's terminal
equipment during the same connection and also covering any further use that may
be made of those devices during subsequent connections. The methods for giving
information, offering a right to refuse or requesting consent should be made as
user-friendly as possible. Access to specific website content may still be made
conditional on the well-informed acceptance of a cookie or similar device, if it is
used for a legitimate purpose.
Id. para. 25.
104. Commission Staff Working Paper, Annex to the:
European Electronic
Communications Regulation and Markets 2004 (10th Report), at 38, COM (2004) 759 final
(Dec. 2, 2004), available at http://ec.europa.eu/information-society/policy/ecomr/doc/
implementation enforcement/annualreports/lOthreport/sec20041535vol 1en.pdf.
105. See supra note 30.
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be applicable in contexts beyond the lower-level network connections. The
reverse is also true: it is possible that other contexts could provide insight
into the appropriate scope of neutrality rules in the network context. The next
section takes up the issue of the implications of these different contexts.
IV. WHAT SORTS OF NON-NEUTRALITY MATTER?

The issues discussed above seem at least to raise significant questions
about non-neutrality. Yet despite the fact that they arguably fit within the
network-neutrality verbal formulas, or at least those of Comcast, they have
not generally been discussed in those terms. Should they be? This question
is especially important as the FCC has recently begun "seeking public input
on draft rules" that would codify and supplement existing Internet openness
principles. 10 6 Will the openness with which the FCC is concerned go
beyond network infrastructure to include applications and intermediaries
that affect users' experiences on the Internet?
Some commentators have noted the development of a broader context for
the application of neutrality principles. As noted above, Jonathan Zittrain has
10 7
drawn a connection between the idea of "API neutrality" and net neutrality.
And some scholars have viewed Google as implicating neutrality issues.10 8
Others, like Berin Szoka and Adam Thierer, also see the possibility of broader
applicability but decry this prospect of "regulatory creep":
Sincere defenders of real Internet Freedom-that is, freedom from
government techno-meddling-recognize that there will always be
disputes over how companies deal with each other online across all layers
of the Internet. The question is not whether we need a technical
coordinating mechanism for handling such disputes. Someone should
mediate conflicts over alleged deviations from abstract neutrality
principles. But should that arbitrator be an inherently political body like
FCC? Or should we instead look to truly independent, apolitical
arbitrators like the Internet Engineering Task Force or collaborative
efforts like the Network Neutrality Squad? Such alternative dispute
resolution mechanisms and fora need not have the power of law to be
effective:
The weight of their expert opinion, based on careful
investigation of the facts, would likely resolve most disputes, because

companies have strong reputational incentives to comply with reasoned

106. Preserving the Open Internet and Broadband Industry Practices, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 24 F.C.C.R. 13,064, 13,082 (Oct. 22, 2009).
107. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
108. See, e.g., Andrew Odlyzko, Network Neutrality, Search Neutrality, and the Neverending Conflict between Efficiency and Fairness in Markets, 8 REv. NETWORK ECON. 40

(2009); Pasquale, supra note 33. Google has also been accused of violating network
neutrality in areas other than search. See Posting of Saul Hansell to Bits, AT&T Says Google
Voice Violates Net Neutrality Principles, http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/09/25/att-saysgoogle-voice-violates-net-neutrality-principles/ (Sept. 25, 2009, 18:58 EDT).
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rulings by truly neutral experts. And the white hot spotlight of public
attention has a way of disciplining marketplace behavior as well. 109
It seems likely that there is a significant correlation between one's
enthusiasm for basic network-neutrality rules and one's comfort with seeing
those rules extended beyond the narrow network context. That is, one is
probably either comfortable with regulation or not. But there is still some
value in considering whether the traditional net-neutrality context is a more
suitable target for neutrality rules than are other related areas, like those
discussed in this essay. Is there something about the provision of Internet
service, and particularly perhaps broadband service, that better justifies
neutrality rules than do those related areas?
One possibility is that there is a federal agency, the FCC, which is
responsible for communication services, but there is no Federal Search
Commission 1 0 or Federal Privacy Commission or Federal CopyrightedWorks-Distribution Commission. But the presence of a regulator does not
make the case for regulation, or at least does not make it for neutrality
regulation in this context, despite the FCC's historical background in
common carriers.
Another possibility is suggested by the quotation above, and perhaps also
by David Post. That is the role played by the Internet Engineering Task
Force. If we are enthusiastic about how the IETF has performed its role in
facilitating development of the Internet, as Post is, perhaps we believe that
offers a mandate for regulating neutrality. We might believe, as Szoka and
Thierer suggest, that the IETF should be the regulator. 1 For this to be a
plausible solution, we would need to consider how well the IETF would
likely perform in this role. The third-party cookie discussion above
suggests that Szoka and Thierer are too optimistic in this regard; even on
the assumption that the IETF would promote the correct rules, the Internet
apparently has evolved beyond the sort of tight-knit community in which
expertise and reputational sanctions are sufficient to ensure compliance.
Alternatively, we might believe that the end-to-end system that the IETF
has created is so effective that it should be defended or preserved in its
current form. The view here would be that the very success of the Internet,
and of its neutral, end-to-end structure, shows that this structure should be
maintained. Here too, though, the world has changed, as Jonathan Zittrain
argues: "Now that the PC and the Internet are so inextricably intertwined, it
is not enough for network engineers to worry only about network openness
and assume that the endpoints can take care of themselves. It is abundantly
clear that many endpoints cannot.""l 2
Zittrain argues for new
intermediaries to help address security issues, which he says pose an
109. Szoka & Thierer, supra note 12, at 5.
110. See Bracha & Pasquale, supra note 34, passim.
111. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
112. ZirrRAIN, supra note 6, at 166-67.

2010]

NON-NETWORK BARRIERS TO NET NEUTRALITY

2869

increasingly great threat. 113 Such intermediaries would, in effect, nonneutralize the network, by isolating certain security threats from certain
users. This form of non-neutrality could provide positive benefits, whereas
in the three issues that have been the focus of this essay, the effects of nonneutrality are presumably negative. In either case, though, the questions are
whether the services at issue are better provided neutrally or non-neutrally.
The primary advantage of neutrality, it seems, is the predictability and
simplicity of interaction when users need not consider any special
characteristics of the interaction. The advantage of non-neutrality is that
there can be tailoring of users' interactions to particular needs. As a result,
there typically will not be one version of non-neutrality, but multiple
competing versions offered by different providers. For example, different
broadband providers could provide different approaches to network
management (reasonable or not), and different search-engines could offer
different amounts of commercial input into search results.
The choice between these alternatives seems likely to turn in large part
on the nature and effectiveness of competition among alternative nonneutralities. Szoka and Thierer, who resist the extension of the neutrality
concept, argue that "the best remedy for concerns about non-neutrality is
competition itself: In the high-tech sector more than any other, disruptive
innovation makes it difficult for even the most successful companies to stay
on top forever.""14 But others argue that this is a market in which
competition may not work well, largely because of the peculiar
characteristics of markets for information. 115 If that competition functions
well, users are likely to benefit from the availability of alternatives; if it
does not, users are likely to suffer. Although this issue cannot be discussed
in detail here, there seem to be a number of factors, derived in part from the
examples discussed earlier, that could be considered in evaluating the
effectiveness of competition in these areas.
One such factor is information about the available alternatives.
Competition among search engines is not likely to work well if users do not
know whether search results are being manipulated, as is the case with
search engines today. 116 This makes non-neutrality in the search-engine
market problematic. Similar informational problems may also exist in the
examples of non-neutrality in response to browsing history discussed
above. For example, if users are unaware that they are being offered prices
different from those offered to other users based on their browsing history,
competition will suffer. In other cases, though, as with the Ticketmaster
113. Id.
114. Szoka & Thierer, supra note 12, at 5-6.
115. Patterson, supra note 33, at 3-4; Competition on the Internet: Hearing Before the
Task Force on Competition Policy and Antitrust Laws of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
110th Cong. 48 (2008) (statement of Frank Pasquale, Professor of Law, Seton Hall Law
School).
116. Bracha & Pasquale, supra note 34, at 1183; Patterson, supra note 33, at 5-9.
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example, where users are denied access to a Web page entirely, the nonneutrality will be known and will be subject to competition. 117 And the
same is true for Comcast's practices, at least to the extent that users could
respond effectively to being denied use of BitTorrent and other providers.
The difficulties with information markets carry over to antitrust law,
118
which those who favor market solutions would use as a backstop.
Antitrust typically focuses on sellers' restrictions of output as evidence of
anticompetitive effect, but anticompetitive conduct by search engines would
not restrict the quantity of information received by users; rather, it would
skew its content. It may be very difficult to prove that sort of skewing and
even more difficult, perhaps, to show exactly how consumers are hurt by it.
Antitrust in fact does not have a well-developed analytical approach to
dealing with informational issues. Although some commentators and
regulators have recently begun to focus on "consumer choice" as an
antitrust issue, the emphasis there is primarily on the elimination of
alternatives, not on informational mechanisms of choice. 119
It is the difficulty of these issues that prompts the calls for disclosure as a
possible remedy. But the support for this approach need not come just from
the economics of information markets. It may also be that a federal policy
of net neutrality makes this, or some other sui generis solution, appropriate.
That is, although we might be willing to tolerate non-neutrality and
informational problems in other contexts-as, perhaps, in the grocery
store' 2 0-we should not do so on the Internet because of the importance of
the role it plays. The generative nature of the Internet is a central concern
here. Although a grocery store serves as an intermediary only for groceries,
the Internet is, or is becoming, an intermediary for everything, and the need
for transparency is correspondingly greater.
Another way to look at the Internet's intermediating role is through the
lens of externalities. An economic actor creates externalities when its
activities create costs or benefits for others and those other effects are not
captured in the actor's incentives. Externalities are often present in
vertically linked markets. For example, peer-to-peer applications like
117. There is still a possible externality issue, though. If Tickets.com provided a superior
interface, but Ticketmaster used its control over ticket access to force use of its own
interface, the control over the ticket market would be facilitating imposition of externalities
in the interface market.
118. Szoka and Thierer, for example, argue that "[g]overnment would still have a role to
play, of course, in enforcing antitrust laws where anticompetitive harm to consumers can be
proven, and in enforcing the promises companies make to consumers." Szoka & Thierer,
supra note 12, at 5.
119. See, e.g., Intel Corp., No. 9341, 2009 WL 4999728 (Fed. Trade Comm'n Dec. 16,
2009) (Rosch, Comm'r, concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The Commission must
also be concerned with whether a course of conduct by a firm with monopoly power reduces
consumer choice by reducing alternatives."); Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Using the
"Consumer Choice " Approach to Antitrust Law, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 175 (2007).
120. One also wonders whether if some sort of mandatory disclosure system were
adopted for search engines, a similar scheme would be instituted elsewhere.
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Napster or BitTorrent can impose negative externalities on copyright
owners by allowing users to gain access to copyrighted works without
paying for them. The doctrines of indirect copyright infringement address
these externalities by making the peer-to-peer programs potentially liable
for the losses to copyright owners. 121 In that sense, they can be said to
reflect a determination that the resulting non-neutrality in the applications
market, in which applications that allow transfer of copyrighted works are
disadvantaged, is appropriate.
But the Supreme Court's focus in Sony on whether the allegedly
infringing technology is "capable of substantial noninfringing uses" also
recognizes that intermediaries can provide positive externalities. 122 This
point seems tailor-made for the generative Internet that is the focus of both
Post and Zittrain.
The Internet certainly offers the capability for
noninfringing uses. Indeed, the Internet, and particularly its end-to-end
nature, is all capability. Although the Ninth Circuit in Napster, and the
Supreme Court in Grokster, focused more on the defendants' knowledge
and intent than on this aspect of Sony,1 23 one could argue that in the Internet
context the capability issue has special bite. The role of many Internet
technologies is to provide access, and the legal issues surrounding these
technologies should emphasize, as Sony directs, this capability. That is, the
emphasis should be less on the interests of the ends-copyright owners,
sellers paying for search results, or websites seeking to price discriminate
among visitors-and more on realizing the potential of the intermediaries.
CONCLUSION

This essay argues that the benefits of neutral end-to-end principles
emphasized by David Post and Jonathan Zittrain extend beyond the network
itself. There are a variety of ways beyond simple network access in which
the Internet is non-neutral. If the right solution to this non-neutrality is not
''124
to "get over it,
it could be useful to broaden neutrality efforts, as some
125
have done,
to consider the legal and practical considerations that prevent
the Internet from being the neutral conduit that advocates of net neutrality
envision. 126 At the least, this broader perspective would provide a
121. In doing so, however, they impose other externalities, by allowing copyright owners
to prevent copying in a way that imposes costs on the competing distribution systems.
122. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
123. Id.
124. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
125. As described above, a number of scholars have pushed for neutrality rules in the
search-engine context. And of course the two goals are not inconsistent. Some scholars,
such as Tim Wu, are engaged in both efforts.
126.
In essence, the CBUI [Coalition of Broadband Users and Innovators] and
academics that support Net neutrality regulation are asking the FCC to mandate a
"dumb pipe-lite" approach to the provision of broadband services. In other words,
as a matter of public policy, BSPs [broadband service providers] should be
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comparative view on the merits of neutrality mandates in different contexts.
And it might be that the result would be to suggest, or provide support for,
additional or alternative neutrality advocacy efforts.

discouraged from bundling new services and software into their broadband pipes.
Much like the antitrust battle over which applications Microsoft should be allowed
to bundle into its Windows operating system, regulatory proponents in this case
are asking for restrictions on the vertical integration of content, applications, and
conduit by BSPs. In the Microsoft skirmish, regulatory proponents sought the
equivalent of a "dumb browser;" in the Net neutrality battle, they seek a dumb
pipe.
Adam Thierer, Are 'Dumb Pipe' Mandates Smart Public Policy? Vertical Integration, Net
Neutrality, and the Network Layers Model, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 275, 287

(2005); see also Bill Thompson, Why the Net Should Stay Neutral, BBC NEWS, Feb, 12,
2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/4700430.stm ("Those in favour of 'network
neutrality' and keeping the current model of the internet as just a data conduit include big
hitters such as Google, eBay, Amazon and even Microsoft.").

